We know that decentralization is an essential element for the strengthening of regions and the distribution of power, two issues that Chile has historically lacked. However, these are not the only objectives of decentralization. On the one hand, decentralization and the distribution of power have a fundamental aspect for the development of a healthy democracy (for example, both horizontal and vertical balances of powers) and in their ability to limit political power by fragmenting it, since, if it is distributed equitably and territorially, and with similar powers, it will then be more difficult for a few to seize power and impose agendas that are to the detriment of the rest of the people. Simply put, the fragmentation of power into regions or federal states is beneficial because it makes it difficult to obtain a large portion of power from politicians.
In all this previous sense, the Constitutional Convention (CC) appeared as a possible opportunity to achieve these desired objectives. Unfortunately, their recent actions make us suspect that this will be a missed opportunity, because the CC is promoting reforms that threaten a good decentralization of power for three main reasons.
First, unicameralism — which seems to be a majority trend within the Convention — is far from being an efficient tool for responsible decentralization, especially in a proportional system, which tends to overrepresent the regions with the largest population (e.g., Valparaíso, Metropolitana and Biobío). This translates into a greater concentration of power in a single camera overrepresented by certain regions that will have greater collective decision-making power and greater capacity to force minority regions to follow a single vision of a good society. In short, quite the opposite of decentralization.
Secondly, opting for complete autonomy of the regions – without checks and balances at different levels of governance – can be a risky experiment that turns out very badly. This is because, while a greater degree of self-government and self-management can be granted to the regions, if this is taken to the extreme of autonomy without counterweights, it can also produce a deep fragmentation with respect to national public policies, thus creating in the region a bubble of inconsequential power and, throughout the country, a set of disconnected islands that make national public policy difficult to implement. In other words, can you imagine what would happen in a fragmented Chile with autonomous regions, with different legal systems, when an upcoming earthquake like the one in 2010 occurs? In addition, the meager benefits that Chile’s “federalization” would bring would be negligible compared to the high economic cost of implementing such a level of regional bureaucracy throughout the country.
However, moving towards a Regional State has a number of implications that have not been entirely clear in the debate. Decentralization is much more that only share competences from the central power to the regions, which does not allow a development according to the territory, and is much less that complete autonomy, which generates a total fragmentation of the country, favoring the large urban centers. Positive decentralization requires a shared set of rules, a healthy balance of powers, checks and balances and collaboration at different levels of public governance to function properly; otherwise, we are talking only about fragmented islands that would destroy the concept of nation.
Third, another of the key aspects of a Regional State is the legislative capacity that is recognized to the regions, which means that they are empowered to generate their own legal norms, which are at the same hierarchical level as national laws as a source of law. This, in theory, is not an entirely negative proposal, as long as it is in line with the concurrent legislations, of which we have several examples in comparative law. Concurrent legislation means that there is no absolute regional legislative autonomy, but that national laws establish the bases of a certain public policy, and that it then gives a mandate to regional laws to adapt these norms to the territorial reality, respecting certain bases of common acuity.erdo.
However, from the Convention emerged the proposal to create a Territorial Council, which works together with Regional Legislative Assemblies. Although this new body would replace the Senate, it would not inherit its powers, since it would only discuss regional laws of a budgetary nature, an issue that makes it impossible, in practice, for the regions to have better representation, since they would lack prominence in the national discussion. Despite being an innovative attempt at decentralization for our republican culture, this was halfway there, since the legislative power of the Regional Legislative Assemblies was rejected, which takes away an important role and, ultimately, its foundation. The norm was reformulated and qualified the legislative power, which means that they can request the Territorial Council to delegate legislative power only for those matters of regional interest. In addition, it would have supervisory powers with respect to the regional government. That is, power continues to be centralized, which will fall to the Territorial Council and the Regional Legislative Assemblies will have no real impact.
Then, this little glimpse of bicameral prudence hid behind a volley of lights. There is nothing bicameral about this asymmetrical bicameralism, since, in practice, the Territorial Council would not have any kind of legislative relevance, let alone function as a counterweight to political power.. Moreover, if we consider that the Regional Legislative Assemblies would lack legislative powers, the regions would have no power in national politics, much less could they feel that they have the capacity to counterbalance politics against the central powers. If they are only going to discuss budgetary issues, the execution of which would be delegated to the Regional Government, this makes this new state organic irrelevant and unnecessary, and only helps to increase this inefficient state apparatus.
In short, this model of asymmetrical bicameralism with an “attenuated” presidentialism can end up in a rather inefficient formula. If the Territorial Council lacks important legislative powers and all those are based in the Plurinational Congress, we will have a dangerous imbalance that would lose the meaning of this institutional reform. If in the attempt to endow this kind of new second chamber with new powers, it means taking away those that are more typical of a legislative process, it will be a mere ornament. And, if we add the fact that the Regional Assemblies will not have legislative power proper, this institutional reform will contribute absolutely nothing to the distribution of power.
It is necessary to respect the fundamental principles of an institutionality such as the one that is to be implemented, granting it the competences that are proper to them and not inventing illusory models that will only lead us to the unnecessary growth of state apparatus, thus leaving us prisoners of the inefficiency of the fragmented state bureaucracy and of an unprecedented centralized power. We still have time to make amends.
The content expressed in this opinion column is the sole responsibility of its author, and does not necessarily reflect the editorial line or position of El Mostrador.
