Why it’s not so easy to talk about a “new turn to the left” in Latin America

Latin America, which is already facing many difficulties since the end of the cycle of the Commodities, is going through a hard crisis in these post-pandemic 2020 years. What was described as a “turn to the left” in the 2000s has been exhausted and the left has lived through difficult times, being displaced from power in general, except in countries where it has adopted openly authoritarian regimes (Venezuela and Nicaragua). Today many speak of the return of the left, as if a new turn were being initiated. The situation, however, is more complicated.
The left turn in the late 90s and 2000s was partial. Not all countries in the region were part of it. However, with the coming to power of many left-wing parties, there was a more or less clear and unprecedented trend in the region. Although their discourse often bordered on revolutionarism, there was a lot of Jacobinism and the prospect of perpetuating themselves in power, they were very moderate in their concrete proposals, with poverty at the center of their social policies and a limited developmentalism. If there are continuities between that cycle and the current period, there are also many differences. It is above all a different left, especially in Chile and Colombia, emerging in Ecuador (unlike Peru, where its conquest of the presidency seems rather fortuitous, despite a certain social base).
Limitations
The limitations of liberal democracy are at the heart of what has happened in Chile. Undoubtedly, the issue of neoliberalism and the restriction of social policies has centrality in the political explosion that began in 2019 with the increase in metro fares.
The very structure of the political system has been called into question. Professional parties and politicians have entered the crosshairs of popular mobilizations, different parties have gained prominence and lists of independent candidates for the constituent elections have emerged, although the new Constitution does not incorporate significant institutional modifications.
In Colombia, renewed with the end of the armed conflict, and partly in post-Correa Ecuador, the enormous social mobilizations, with the issue of democracy back on the agenda, point to a different approach to politics, with decentralized social movements and autonomous parties. The issue of nature gains prominence as it only achieved in the best moments of the Lula da Silva governments in Brazil, while the Colombian “tasty living”, following the example of the Andean “buen vivir”, does not point to solutions to the problems of the great masses.
If it is even likely, at least at this point, that Lula will win against the current far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro, this can hardly be classified as the return of the left to power. The situation is very different from that of the 2000s and, if this victory occurs, it will be more the result of unity against Bolsonaro’s open authoritarianism than real support for Lula and the Workers’ Party (PT), although a consistent democratic front has not been constituted and mass mobilizations have been ruled out (at least until August 11, with the reading of the charter for democracy and demonstrations).
In Argentina, the situation of alberto Fernández’s government is very bad, with Vice President Cristina Kirchner as almost the main opposition, and the risk of an electoral defeat on the horizon for next year. In Bolivia, despite the dominance of the MAS, Evo Morales’ eagerness to return to power, as always by any means, may lead to a new political crisis, now with his own party. In Uruguay, the center-right rules.
Threats to liberal democracy
In short, the Latin American political landscape seems today much closer to the situation of alternation of parties in liberal democracy stabilized in much of the world. The problems are very different from the assumptions of a left for which Leninism continues to appear as a strategic vector. What is obvious is the separation between the oligarchies – political, economic and financial – and the commons – those who are and feel excluded from the exercise of political power.
Liberal democracy was democratized throughout the twentieth century through the emergence of mass organizations, such as parties and trade unions, with the paradoxical control and closure of their main steps.it is to popular participation. Mechanisms of direct participation were rarely used, such as councils and referendums, or the classic Greek lottery, which allowed anyone to participate in power (not to mention that the popular character of power soon became a mere simulacrum in “real socialism”).
The processes of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have positioned Latin America in contemporaneity, along with the part of the world with which it has more similarities and political connections: Europe and the United States. He shares the same problems, with no clear solutions, as well as having little money. However, we must be particularly attentive to political issues, actively addressing them, especially with regard to the democratization of democracy.

If it is to operate in the state political systems (executive and legislative), the corporate political systems, where in fact the plebeian citizens of modernity move, must find new channels of influence, interference and veto in relation to those. According to classical Republicans, corruption corresponds to the very decay of institutions. This is what happens with today’s liberal democracy.
The challenge of elections in Brazil
The Brazilian elections of 2022 must be placed on this horizon. Defeating Bolsonaro and the threat of fascism adapted to the twenty-first century is crucial, an absolute priority. But this far right does not gain support out of thin air. If there are those in contemporary societies who hold intrinsically reactionary values, it is due to the dissatisfaction of the population, especially when they do not see in the left a transformative alternative.
This is what has happened in Brazil, since the demonstrations of 2013, rejected by the dominant forces of the left. The mistakes of Lula and the PT were enormous in the government, including corruption, the closure of society and the very bad period of Dilma Rousseff, as well as an electoral stelionate in 2014. The party survived in part thanks to the president’s own impeachment. In defending itself, the PT seems to have come to believe in its total innocence. But this is false, and this is not how the population sees it. In addition, the neo-patriarchalism that radically plagues the political system in Brazil – and which many ridiculously try to deny – will make life very difficult for Lula or anyone else committed to democracy. The temptation to make the same mistakes will always be present.
A democratic government from January 2023 can only be transitional. But we must not imagine that the recovery of democracy can be reduced to resuming demoralized political formulas, complemented by social policies for the poor. The ground must be cleared for a return to democracy that deepens it in the long term. Otherwise, the crisis and the far right will always be lurking.

Follow us on

The content expressed in this opinion column is the sole responsibility of its author, and does not necessarily reflect the editorial line or position of El Mostrador.

Original source in Spanish

Related Posts

Add Comment