One of the central themes of the constitutional debate in Chile has undoubtedly been the question of the rights of nature. The debate reflects a more than current concern, both in Chile and internationally: think, for example, of anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) climate change, biodiversity loss, increasing pollution and the transformation of wild and pristine areas. In this sense, the need to define more sustainable political lines and in accordance with the preservation of a system highly vulnerable to human intervention as the natural one, is more than evident. It is worth asking, however, whether the best way to do this is to grant rights to nature, or whether there are other theoretically more consistent and simple ways.
Traditionally, to ensure that human beings could not use “natural resources” in a disrespectful, far-fetched or irresponsible way, environmental ethics have raised the issue of the intrinsic value of nature itself. With this, we wanted to affirm the value of nature regardless of its “usability” or “functionality” for human beings. In short, they wanted to affirm that nature – namely, the different non-human living beings – did not have only an instrumental value. That is, nature represented a good in itself, independent of human ends. Many contemporary philosophers have successfully walked this path.
Lately – and Chilean constituents have used this strategy very often – the need to recognize rights to nature has been raised. This possibility – which seems to be very attractive and novel – actually presents different theoretical problems. Among them, perhaps the most obvious is precisely the granting of a right to “someone” (it would have to be seen if he is indeed a “someone”) who cannot recognize this right and, therefore, cannot have duties. We know, in fact, that any right always implies a duty on the part of someone else (who has to make that right respected). On the other hand, it also implies the fact that the “someone” to whom the right is recognized can fulfill some duties (or has the potential to do so). In this sense, we can say that rights are relational, that is, they are always given and realized in a context of relationships. It is worth asking, then, that once we grant the right to life to a living being – a lion, for example – will he be willing to fulfill other duties – for example, the fundamental duty to respect my right to life? Or are we willing to recognize the right to life of all forms of life – including, for example, the life of a aedes aegypti, dengue mosquito and yellow fever? This aporia is only the most obvious and simple.
In order not to be trapped in aporias – or dead ends – such as the one highlighted, perhaps it is opportune to take other paths, more appealable and within our reach. One of them is to recognize that nature has a value that obliges the human being – who are the only beings who can consciously and voluntarily make decisions – to be a responsible custodian of it. The human being, in this sense, should not think of nature as a cornucopia, that is, as a large warehouse from which goods and resources can be extracted without limits. The human being, on the contrary, is that being who is aware of the finitude of our planet, of the power and irreversibility of its technological interventions and of the complexity of its impact on ecosystems. Put briefly, it is the human being who has a duty towards a reality that has a manifest value, such as nature. From this, responsible and long-term policies can be developed. And, above all, respectful of the “natures”, both that of non-human beings and that of the human being himself.
The content expressed in this opinion column is the sole responsibility of its author, and does not necessarily reflect the editorial line or position of El Moysterer.
